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Abstract: This article explores how the recognition of the gender identity of trans people can have negative
consequences on their reproductive health and rights. First, it argues that, while both the right to gender
identity and the right to sexual and reproductive health are part of the indivisible core of human rights, in
practice trans people are forced to choose between them. Understanding this scenario requires focusing on the
eugenic dimensions of trans policies, even in states where the recognition of a gender identity other than that
assigned at birth is not tied to surgical or hormonal compromises. The concept of “passive eugenics”, coined
over twenty years ago by James Bowman, offers a valuable key in this respect. Second, the paper highlights
some factors that hinder a successful approach to the reproductive health and rights of trans people. These
factors include: the normative imageries about the reproductive capacities and desires of trans people,
representations about pregnancy and “womanhood”, and the form taken by identity politics in contemporary
feminist movements. The attention given as a priority (if not exclusively) to initiatives for the legalisation of
voluntary abortion, understood as a right pertaining to (cis) women, offers a significant example of these
difficulties. Finally, the paper advocates the adoption of a reproductive justice approach to work on sexual
and reproductive health and rights, arguing that it has, among other virtues, that of challenging the binary
matrix that characterises Western thought. DOI: 10.1080/26410397.2020.1824318
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Introduction
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that
although both the right to gender identity and
the right to sexual and reproductive health are
human rights – and, as such, are part of the indi-
visible core of rights that a person should have –
in practice, trans people (i.e. people who identify
with a gender other than the one assigned at
birth) are forced to choose between them.
These scenarios require looking into the eugenic
dimension of trans policies even in states where
the recognition of a gender identity other than
that assigned at birth is not tied to surgical or
hormonal compromises. Here, the Argentinian
case, which will be the main focus of the
paper, is particularly salient, given the progress-
ive nature of its normative framework on gender
identity.
Unlike other eugenic policies, the policies in
Argentina do not aim to decrease the proportion
of people with certain traits among the population
(as if transness were hereditary), but to maintain
gender order: women have the capacity to gestate,
men to produce sperm. This is not a new phenom-
enon, for example, the Terman-Miles M-F Test is an
example of attempts to maintain gendered order
that can be counted among the ordinary eugenics
of the twentieth century.1–3 I here follow the con-
cept of “passive eugenics” as coined by Bowman,4
who introduces the distinction between “active
eugenics” and “passive eugenics”. The first category
applies to policies that encourage or discourage
reproduction among certain populations. The
second applies to policies that, while not openly
aimed at discouragement, have the same effect,
such as “the denial of adequate health care… ,
the social neglect of vaccination programs… ,
the voting against child welfare by… anti-choice
activists”.4 According to Bowman, these all reflect
societal hypocrisy about [the consequences of]
a health care system that is inferior to that of
all major industrialised countries, even though
politicians and corporate czars in our health care
and insurance industries equivocate in proclaim-
ing that our health care system is the best in the
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world. Such proclamations need to be challenged
since, as Bowman warns, “a society that accepts
passive eugenics provides fertile ground for both
clandestine and overt active eugenics”.4 Building
on Nixon’s work,5 this paper will look into the
forms of passive eugenics endorsed and reinforced
by contemporary social movements advocating the
legalisation of voluntary abortion.
Additionally, some factors are highlighted that
hinder an adequate approach to trans people’s
reproductive health and rights. The first concerns
normative thinking about the reproductive
capacities and desires of trans people, and about
pregnancy and “womanhood”. The second refers
to the strong investment in identity politics main-
tained by progressive social movements around
sexual and reproductive health and rights. At
least in its contemporary expressions, identity poli-
tics prioritises (if not exclusively focuses on) initiat-
ives such as promoting the legalisation of
voluntary abortion, understood as a right of (cis)
women. Given the recent parliamentary treatment
of the legalisation of voluntary abortion in Argen-
tina, the considerations in this paper will be
applied to the Argentinian context. The concept
of “gender identity”, which will be deployed in
the terms of The Yogyakarta Principles (2007), is
central to this exercise. The definition provided
by the Principles challenges old conceptions
anchored in gender and sexual difference binaries
and evidences the need to reconfigure our insti-
tutions and our political imagination.6
This article advocates the adoption of a repro-
ductive justice approach to work on sexual and
reproductive health and rights. The approach has
the virtue of integrating reproductive health into
social justice, by taking as its basis the theories of
intersectionality7 and the universality and indivisi-
bility of human rights, consequently challenging
the binary matrix that characterises Western
thought. Hence, it offers a new look that disman-
tles the false dichotomies present in contemporary
debates on sexual and reproductive health and
rights.
False dichotomies are verbal manoeuvres that
reduce multiple options to two and present them
as contradictory, thus forcing a choice between
them. Although such dichotomies are logically
flawed, they tend to be psychologically persuasive.
Avoiding their traps will allow us to “imagin[e] bet-
ter futures through radical forms of resistance and
criticism”8 – futures in which trans people do not
have to choose between their human rights.
Finally, it should be noted that the analysis
that follows does not include trans women, nor
does it make explicit references to intersex
people. This is due, firstly, to the fact that, to
date, the political agenda of trans women in
Argentina has not centred issues related to
trans pregnancy and reproductive rights. This
does not mean, of course, that they do not have
family planning needs nor that activism on
these topics is not relevant or does not exist,
but rather that historical and circumstantial
reasons have led the agenda along other paths.
Secondly, although the challenges and debates
faced by intersex people have tended to be
wrongly equated with those encountered by
trans endosex people, there are substantial
differences which call for specific work that is
currently being pursued by highly qualified inter-
sex scholars.
Eugenics is said in many ways
The etymological meaning of the term
“eugenics” might seem harmless were it not
for its historical connotations, which link it to
programmes of selective breeding, medical
experimentation, and death camps. While the
imaginaries surrounding these terms refer us
directly to the Holocaust, the eugenic impulse
can be traced even further back. Within the
European context, eugenic ideas can be found
in ancient times, such as in classical Greek lit-
erature.4,9,10 Perhaps one of the most prominent
examples in this respect is Plato’s Republic,
where the philosopher recommends methods
to improve the genetic constitution of the elite
class and establishes an analogy with the selec-
tive breeding of non-human animals in order
to obtain the desired stock.
In its modern version, eugenics was developed
by scientist Francis Galton, who was interested in
creating “better human beings” through the scien-
tific management of mating, “a preferable alterna-
tive to natural selection among humans”.11 In his
words, eugenics was
“the science of improving stock, which is by no
means confined to questions of judicious mating,
but which, especially in the case of man, takes cog-
nisance of all influences that tend in however
remote a degree to give to the more suitable races
or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing spee-
dily over the less suitable than they otherwise would
have had”.12
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Galton’s ideas had a significant impact in the first
part of the twentieth century, and often resulted
in genetic engineering health projects interested
in “improving” humanity. The idea of breeding
desirable persons or traits was translated, in its posi-
tive version, into political programmes that pro-
vided monetary incentives and stipends to favour
the reproduction of certain types of people. In its
negative version, eugenics took the form of pro-
grammes for racial purification through the forced
sterilisations of persons deemed unfit to reproduce.
Negative eugenics primarily targeted people with
mental illness, poor people and people of colour,
and sought to prevent their genes from “polluting”
the gene pool. Additionally, in a context where
criminality was seen as a hereditary biological pro-
blem, sterilisation was considered a “more humane”
way to prevent the reproduction of “degenerates”,
who would inevitably engage in corrupt, immoral
and vicious activity.2
For trans people in many countries, the resigna-
tion of their reproductive capacities has been, and
still is, a condition to access the legal recognition of
gender identity. In some cases, forced sterilisation
can be a result of the requirements established by
legislation or the court, even when it is not openly
stipulated in the text of the law. Lowik3 has shown
how cisnormativity and the “best interests of the
child” play a determining role in establishing
these eugenic requirements. The requirements
include, for example, an “adjustment of sexual
characteristics by means of medical-surgical treat-
ment previously authorized by the courts”;13
accreditation of at least two years of hormonal
treatment “to accommodate the physical charac-
teristics of the claimed sex”;14 or the “removal of
sexual organs and mammary glands for trans
men and the removal of sexual organs (testicles
and penis) for trans women”.15 In other cases,
the legislation is more explicit and requires the
person requesting the change to certify that they
are “no longer capable of producing children
with their previous gender”;16 that they are “defi-
nitely incapable of procreation” – if her birth certi-
ficate recognises her as a woman – or “definitely
incapable of giving birth” – if he will be recognised
as a man;17 that they are “sterile or incapable of
reproduction”;18…) or have “no reproductive
glands or their function has been permanently
lost”.19
The initiatives against the eugenics programme
that these requirements put in place have brought
together researchers and activists across the world.
The Transgender Europe (TGEU) network, for
instance, produces annual reports on the legal situ-
ation of trans people in all 47 Council of Europe
member States (and, more recently, in five Central
Asian countries as well). These reports include a
detailed index by country and a map that dis-
tinguishes states that do not “have a legal gender
recognition procedure in place” from those that
do, and within the latter identifies legal systems
in which trans people must undergo a sterilisation
procedure before changing their registration data.
A comparative analysis of the maps produced with
a difference of only four years shows that in 2016,
23 European countries allowed for legal gender
recognition but required “that trans people
undergo mandatory sterilisation before changing
their gender marker”,20 whereas in 2020 only 12
did so.21 However, this decrease in the number
of countries which required sterilisation pro-
cedures is not demonstrative of eugenic ideologies
and policies ending in these countries writ large.
The current state of eugenics
The Argentinian Gender Identity Law is recognised
worldwide for its progressive nature. The law,
enacted in 2012, does not tie the recognition of
gender identity to any bodily modification and
therefore does not require people to give up
their reproductive capacities. In its second article,
the law adopts the definition of “gender identity”
provided by the Yogyakarta Principles (2007) and
states:
“Gender identity is understood as the internal and
individual experience of gender as each person
feels it, which may or may not correspond to the
sex assigned at birth, including the personal experi-
ence of the body. This may involve modification of
the appearance or function of the body through
pharmacological, surgical, or other means, if freely
chosen. It also includes other gender expressions
such as clothing, speech, and manners.” (Ley No 26)
In these terms, the law establishes an administra-
tive mechanism to modify data in identity docu-
ments, emphasising self-determination and not
requiring diagnostic accreditation, body examin-
ations, or surgical commitments. Correspondingly,
Argentina does not require forced sterilisation as a
condition for recognition of a gender identity other
than that assigned at birth.
It is important to note that Argentinian legis-
lation does not determine a repertoire of available
identity categories. Precisely because it
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understands that gender is a subjective experience,
it leaves this definition to the experience of each
person. Under these circumstances, for example,
in November 2018, the Civil Registry of the pro-
vince of Mendoza proceeded to rectify a person’s
registration by leaving the field “sex” blank on
their birth certificate.22
This is key when considering issues of sexual
health and sexual and reproductive rights, because
it implies that Argentina recognises with the force
of the law the existence of women who produce
sperm, men with childbearing potential, and
people who do not identify as either men or
women and who also retain their reproductive
capacities. Does this law put an end to trans
eugenics in Argentina? I look at this in more detail.
Given the tradition that used to govern the pro-
cesses of modifying registry data in the courts (that
is, before 2012), the value of the Gender Identity
Law tends to be weighted not only in terms of
what it does, but also in terms of what it prevents.
Moira23 has shown how, to this effect, the Law
works as a hinge that distributes, in a differential
way, the positive and negative aspects of a story
of linear progress.23,24 While evil is assigned to
the past – the moment before the law – good is
inaugurated by it. The temporal Manichaeism
that organises this narrative sequence inclines us
to think of eugenics, along with judicialisation
and pathologisation, as problems of the past. How-
ever, these accounts hinder a political reading that
is sensitive, for example, to the injustices that the
law inaugurates or to those that it does not dis-
mantle24 – eugenics among them. Discourses
that locate all problems in the past, together
with the choice of certain (agents and) events as
milestones,23 instead of observing complex pro-
cesses on a large scale, fail to note the ways in
which “contemporary injustice often manifests
itself in the form of structural repetition or the con-
tinuity of injustices with a long history”.25
So, rather than declaring victory, it should be
noted that withdrawing the requirements of forced
sterilisation is not equivalent to developing policies
for fertility preservation and family planning. In
fact, since the passage of the Gender Identity
Law, the sexual and reproductive health of the
trans population has hardly been a priority and
has not been comprehensively integrated into
state policies.
In Argentina, to date, no new programmes have
been developed in these areas, nor has there been
a revision of existing ones, which were largely
designed by and for cis women. On the other
hand, although the Gender Identity Law guaran-
tees access to “integral health”, it is necessary to
point out that the health-related aspects of the
law were the last to be regulated (three years
after the rest) and had no budget assigned.
Additionally, the belated regulation made no refer-
ence to sexual and reproductive health, but only to
“total and partial surgical interventions and/or
integral hormonal treatments to adapt their
bodies, including their genitals, to their self-per-
ceived gender identity”.26
The primary objective of these policies (or
absence thereof) is not to prevent or discourage
the reproduction of trans people. However, this is
one of the results. The lack of policies towards
the preservation of fertility and – more generally
– the lack of adequate healthcare policies is an
example of what Bowman calls “passive
eugenics”.4
The United Kingdom (UK) offers a good example
of how existing policies – and not their absence –
aim at sterilising trans people. In the UK, trans
people have never been legally required to
renounce their reproductive abilities. However,
its health system discourages reproduction and
encourages the practices of removing the uterus,
ovaries, and fallopian tubes. Reproduction is dis-
couraged on medical grounds, albeit with very
weak clinical evidence.27–29
The eugenic residue in these two cases – existing
policies, as in the UK, or the lack thereof, as in
Argentina – may go unnoticed by those who
focus more on the intent of legislation and public
policy than on their effective impact. If we focus
instead on what law does rather than on what it
says it does,30 that is, if we consider the dimension




The obstacles that prevent trans people from exer-
cising their sexual and reproductive rights are not
only found in their legal regulation, but also in
the cultural articulation of such rights. Collective
imaginaries about reproduction are governed by
a series of myths about gender, its roles, desires,
and bodies. This political mythology is not only
internalised and (re)produced by individuals, but
also by institutions. This is in large part due to
the articulation between medicine and justice,
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and the commitment of both to sexual difference
and the gender binary. In this cultural framework,
trans people and the ability to reproduce are pre-
sented as mutually exclusive. The metaphors of the
“wrong body”, “gender dysphoria”, the “voluntary”
renunciation of the ability to procreate, and “het-
erosexuality”, form the basis of the idea that con-
ceives trans people as a sterile population,
without reproductive will or fertile sexual prac-
tices.31–34 To a large extent, trans individuals and
activism took ownership of these representations35
because this maximised opportunities to access
surgical and registration changes.31,32,36 This has
allowed for an eugenic social atmosphere that
becomes independent from positive and/or legisla-
tive eugenic measures.
Thus, even though we have witnessed the devel-
opment of new technologies that challenge our
beliefs about human reproduction, the latter
seems to remain within an exclusively cis domain.
These beliefs are crystallised in representations
about pregnancy, which our culture recognises
and represents as a process unique and quintes-
sential to (cis) women and, although it is a tempor-
ary experience, pregnancy ceases to be a
“condition” and becomes an identity.37 In this
manner, women’s identity as such depends on
pregnancy and their bodies are represented as if
they were expecting babies.38 In other words, it is
understood that pregnancy is an experience
unique to women and that women are women
because they get pregnant – a feedback loop that
keeps the gears of the repronormative order in
motion.39
The combination of these semantic regimes (the
one that makes trans people irreproducible and
the one that makes pregnancy synonymous with
a woman’s identity) results in turning a pregnant
man into an oxymoron.40 The figure of the preg-
nant trans man challenges gender assumptions in
such a profound way that he becomes impercepti-
ble: he can only be seen as an overweight man.37,41
A simplified scheme of the socially available rep-
resentations can be organised through the follow-
ing negative theses: (1) trans pregnancy is illegal;
(2) if it is not illegal, it is unviable; and (3). if it is
viable, it is invisible. Even when visible, trans preg-
nancy is represented as the first and only one, as
insightfully shown by Pearce and White.42 From
this perspective, it makes sense to doubt the
need to develop sexual and reproductive health
policies for this population. Are there any
alternatives?
With a critical perspective, (lesbian) feminist
theorists and activists have questioned the hetero-
sexual economy that makes (cis) women the forced
reproducers of the species.43,44 Their incisive
developments on abortion and contraception cut
across the normative fantasy that fuses sex and
reproduction, enabling (cis) women to avoid the
role socially imposed to them. “Woman is not
synonymous with mother,” the feminist motto
goes. However, given feminism’s ontological
dependence on sexual difference,45,63 it often
seems that to bear children – and/or to refuse to
do so – one must necessarily be a woman. That
is why sexual and reproductive rights claims
adopt identity strategies that formulate their
demands in terms of “women’s rights”. Anna Weiss-
man has pointed out that “by determining who is
considered illegitimate to reproduce, there is a reifi-
cation of who can (and must) produce”46 and, con-
versely, establishing who can reproduce defines
who should not. What is most striking in the case
under analysis here, however, is that it is the
same movement that seeks to denaturalise the
role of (cis) women as mothers and oppose repro-
normative discourses, that reinscribes them in
the very act of opposing them.47
On rights and the subjects of rights
Defining the subject of feminism has not been
without tension. Asking who the subjects of femin-
ism are is not only asking who the spokespersons
of the movement are, but according to which
urgencies (that is: whose urgencies) demands are
defined. The controversies surrounding the
domain of the term “woman” (who are women?)
and the universe of discourse of the subjects of sex-
ual and reproductive rights (e.g. who are the sub-
jects of pregnancy and abortion) are also
determining factors in the definition of the agenda
and the political subject of feminism.
The sexual and reproductive rights movement is
often presented as a great step forward in the his-
tory of women’s rights. While these movements
have undoubtedly been advantageous, it may be
useful to make some clarifications about which
rights and which women are reached by such
initiatives.
According to the International Conference on
Population and Development Report (1994),64
sexual and reproductive health is a state of
physical, mental, and social well-being in all
matters relating to sexuality and the reproduc-
tive system. Good sexual and reproductive
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health, then, implies that people have a satisfy-
ing and safe sex life; the ability to reproduce
and the freedom to decide if, when, how
often, and under what circumstances to do so;
and the information and means to do so with-
out discrimination or violence.
In line with this characterisation, the catalogue
of sexual and reproductive rights is not reduced to
the right to voluntary termination of pregnancy. In
any case, abortion has typically been the more
privileged focus of right-to-choose initiatives.
Movements with intersectional agendas, on the
other hand, have historically questioned this
reduction.
In “Racism, Birth Control and Reproductive
Rights”, Angela Davis48 observes how reproduc-
tive rights agendas are marked by class, race,
and nationality biases. According to her, white
and bourgeois women at the beginning of the
twentieth century could see in the right to
birth control the possibility of planning their
pregnancies and advancing in their professional
development. But this, which for privileged
women can be interpreted as a right, is not so
for women of colour, migrant women, and
poor women. Davis points out that for them,
birth control represents a racist imperative that
translates into a moral obligation to reduce
the size of their families (due to their living con-
ditions) and into state programmes of extermi-
nation. Examples of such eugenic programmes
abound even in our times, showing how for
some subjects the social regulation of their
reproductive life has been a central aspect of
racial oppression.49 The birth control policy
implemented in Peru during the Fujimori gov-
ernment, for instance, resulted in the sterilisa-
tion of more than 310,000 low-income
Quechua, Aymara, Shipiba and Ashaninka
women.50 The same can be said of the policies
of socialist Czechoslovakia, aimed at reducing
the birth rate of the Roma population, includ-
ing, among other things, programmes of free
hormonal contraception, permission to abort,
and inducement to sterilisation through financial
rewards and other persuasion strategies
implemented by social workers.51 In short, if
we begin to see beyond the universalised idea
of “women”, things become ever more complex.
Us or them: a false dilemma
In Argentina, the recent Parliamentary debate on
the legalisation of voluntary termination of
pregnancy led to discussions about who are the
subjects with the capacity to gestate, who are the
subjects of rights, and who are allies. These discus-
sions might have gone unnoticed for those who
considered that the only ongoing debate was that
of people against the legalisation of abortion vs.
people who supported it. A careful consideration
of the nuances within the debate over the legalisa-
tion of abortion, however, suggests that another
underlying debate was simultaneously occurring,
and shows how assumptions about the pregnant,
abortion-seeking person were prevalent on all
sides of the legalisation debate.
Although they had conflicting objectives, both
the initiatives of the more conservative sectors
against legalisation and the legal strategies of the
social movements for legalisation of voluntary
abortion assumed that all people with the capacity
to carry a pregnancy – and therefore to have an
abortion – are women. Moreover, organisations
bearing green bandanas (the symbol chosen by
the movement seeking legalisation) defended this
and placed their demands in the coordinates of
(cis) women’s human rights focusing on the dignity,
full authority, capacity, and right of (cis) women to
decide for themselves and their bodies.
Trans men highlighted that the category
“women” does not fully coincide with that of
“people who can become pregnant”: on the one
hand, because there are women who cannot
become pregnant, on the other, because there
are people who are not women who in fact become
pregnant and have abortions – as is the case with
some non-binary people and trans men. These dis-
cussions have a long history in Argentina. They
started well before the passing of the Gender Iden-
tity Law, in a context where non-binary identities
were not yet visible in the public sphere as they
are now. “Travesti” identity (in Argentina, referring
to people assigned male at birth) may be con-
sidered a non-binary identity in an analytical
sense, however, insofar as travestis do not consider
themselves either female or male, it is also true
that they do not identify as “non-binary” and this
group is beyond the scope of the analysis here.
Also, although ongoing demands by trans mascu-
line activists soon incorporated into their speech
the sense of a diverse community (referring to
people assigned female at birth (AFAB) or “people
with the capacity to carry a pregnancy”, for
example), this acknowledgement was mostly
ignored by cis feminist activists participating in
the conversations referred to here.
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In any case, attempts to enable these conversa-
tions and the possibilities for articulation with
organisations and activists working towards the
legalisation of abortion was met with enormous
resistance: “Women decide, men accompany”
became a shibboleth, a password – unsayable for
trans men – that served the purpose of distinguish-
ing friends from foes. As explained in previous sec-
tions, movements seeking to undo the reifying ties
between womanhood and reproduction effectively
contributed to eugenic understandings – and,
potentially, their resulting policies – of who has
no place in reproduction.
Some green bandana organisations argued that
the demands by trans men were too novel, that
trans men were too few in number and/or had
not been involved in the political process in favour
of legalising abortion, that they could harm the
legislative debate, and – above all – that they
wanted to harm women.34,52,53 Under these
terms, any alliance with trans men was presented
as, at best, unstrategic, or, at worst, a threat that
had to be resisted. At times, the discussion looked
very much like a dilemma: the defence of (cis)
women’s rights and the defence of trans men’s
rights were presented as mutually exclusive
options. Running over trans men’s rights appeared
to be an undesirable but necessary consequence of
claiming women’s rights. In other words, the cho-
sen way to counter repronormative discourses
affecting (cis) women seemed to necessarily involve
fuelling repronormative (eugenic) discourses
affecting trans men.
Of the various bills discussed in the National
Congress, only one considered “all persons” as sub-
jects of rights.54 The rest referred strictly to (cis)
women and, in some cases, in an additional
article55 or in its rationale56 extended its reach to
other persons with capacity to gestate, in accord-
ance with the Gender Identity Law. Finally, the
opinion adopted by the plenary of Deputies intro-
duced the formula “woman or pregnant person” in
all articles. The change in vocabulary, however,
was not an expression of a change in the criteria
for political participation or in the movement’s
agenda. On the contrary, in Argentina political cor-
rectness in language (such as the use of “inclusive”
or “gender-neutral” language) often works as a
means to rule out any opportunity for change look-
ing towards effective participation. In this case, the
addition of the term “pregnant person” to the pro-
ject did not mean that the doors to dialogue and
collective work were opened,34 nor did it involve
a review of reproductive health initiatives, policies
and rights. The guidelines currently in force for
cases where abortion is already legal, developed
by the Ministry of Health, continue to be aimed
exclusively at cis population. The Protocol for the
Comprehensive Care of Persons Entitled to the
Legal Termination of Pregnancy, updated in
2019, recognizes the existence of trans people
AFAB but “for the purpose of facilitating reading”
chooses not to refer to them throughout the docu-
ment.58 Meanwhile, although the current official
guidelines for contraceptive methods refers to
“trans gender identity”, it is built on a cisnormative
framework, distinguishing, for instance, between
“the physiology of sexual organs of woman and
man”.57
It is interesting to analyse the role that progress-
ive measures actually play in this scenario. It is
often the case that, far from being an indicator
of best practices, they are a serious and hardly vis-
ible obstacle to their development and effective
implementation. Apart from the use of “politically
correct formulas” to refer to the subject of abor-
tion, described above, this is also often the case
with the use of “inclusive language” and even
with appeals to the Gender Identity Law, which
tend to work rhetorically as a proof of measures
that have not been taken. For example, in recent
research by the Gender and Politics Project in
Latin America, the Argentina report included the
Gender Identity Law as a part of the legal frame-
work on sexual and reproductive rights for trans
populations. While the Argentinian Gender Identity
Law is exemplary in many respects and bans forced
sterilisation, it includes no other reference to sex-
ual and reproductive rights, simply because this
is beyond its intended scope. The cost of pretend-
ing that these rights are covered (in this case, by cit-
ing laws that do not refer to them) is, once again,
paid by trans people who find neither the needed
access to such policies, nor the adequate political
spaces to expose and address this lack. Thus, by
hiding the ways in which trans subjects are
excluded from public policies related to sexual
and reproductive health, or by invoking them at
a mere rhetorical level, these dynamics are in soli-
darity with passive eugenics. By presenting existing
measures and policies as inclusive, the problems
faced by trans people in relation to reproduction
are made invisible and even unintelligible. There-
fore, while preserving a progressive image, these
discourses contribute to an order in which,
although there are no policies that explicitly and
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actively discourage or disable trans reproduction,
the absence of concrete policies has an analogous
effect.
Towards reproductive justice
The identity-based commitments of sexual and
reproductive rights activism in Argentina trans-
lated into a liberal agenda focused on abortion
and cis women. Given the enormous prevalence
of this type of approach in our country and in
the region, at times it may be difficult to consider
addressing these issues from other conceptual fra-
meworks. With the intention of dismantling this
resistance, this section offers some proposals
framed in the paradigm of reproductive justice,
with the aim of settling several of the problems
analysed above.
Reproductive justice emerged from the experi-
ences of Black women as subjugated knowledge,
that is, knowledge that was excluded by the domi-
nant movement for the legalisation of abortion.
The concept of “reproductive justice” was coined
in 1994 to shed light on the forms of intersectional
oppression that threaten the bodily integrity of
Black women.8,59,60 According to Loreta Ross,
“We created ‘reproductive justice’ because we
believed that true health care for women needed
to include a full range of reproductive health ser-
vices. While abortion is one primary health issue,
we knew that abortion advocacy alone inadequately
addressed the intersectional oppressions of white
supremacy, misogyny, and neoliberalism. From the
perspective of African American women, any health
care plan must include coverage for abortions, con-
traceptives, well-woman preventive care, pre- and
postnatal care, fibroids, infertility, cervical and
breast cancer, infant and maternal morbidity and
mortality, intimate partner violence, HIV/AIDS,
and other sexually transmitted infections.”8
Intersectionality allows the reproductive justice
approach to avoid the dead ends of current iden-
tity politics approaches and to conceptualise het-
erogeneous identities as crossroads of complex
webs of belonging.7,61 The intersectional approach
was developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw as a critique
of movements that seek social change from a
single angle. Its theoretical commitment means
that “women’s” identity is not the only relevant fac-
tor in shaping political movements and defining
the subjects of rights. This is not only a political
gain (as “it attends to the specific needs of the
different groups involved”), but also “reinforces
the epistemological proposal itself: it ensures a
more responsible, sophisticated and realistic
knowledge of the phenomena we are dealing
with”.61
In fact, movements for reproductive justice are
openly hospitable to trans people. This means
that their analysis of the political scenarios of dis-
cussions of sexual and reproductive health and
rights is not reduced to the struggle between acti-
vists in favour and activists against the legalisation
of abortion, but offers a new viewpoint that dis-
mantles the false dichotomies present in contem-
porary debates.
This mindset understands that systemic inequal-
ity has always influenced people’s decisions about
childbearing and the upbringing of their children.
Consequently, it addresses the various forces that
influence the social places individuals occupy in
society and their individual freedoms (forces such
as racism, sexism, poverty, ableism, sexual orien-
tation, and age). For this reason, its activists under-
stand that advocating reproductive justice does not
stop at the right to abortion, access to contracep-
tives, or even at respectful childbirth, but also –
and above all – entail dismantling social and
health inequalities throughout the life cycle. This
implies working on all public policies, considering
the different aspects that affect reproduction and
the upbringing of children. It includes:
“freedom of movement, immigration restrictions,
the prison-industrial complex, racial and gender bin-
aries, racial profiling and police brutality, racist and
sexist media portrayals, resource allocations
through tax policies, welfare and public assistance,
health care systems, insurance affordability, housing
availability, eviction policies, food insecurity, edu-
cational opportunities, zoning regulations, public
utilities, internal displacement through natural dis-
asters or eminent domain, voting rights, religious
bigotry, credit, finance regulations, civil liberties
restrictions, and environmental racism.”8
Regulations that dictate who can and should
have children and under what conditions are
ways of exercising power over all communities.
This exercise disproportionately punishes the
most vulnerable people: people of colour,
migrants, people with disabilities, trans people,
among others. While contemporary expressions
of identity politics tend to benefit the economic
and racial interests of hegemonic groups, the
model of reproductive justice, and its particular
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way of engaging with the promotion and protec-
tion of sexual and reproductive rights, allows for
“imagining better futures through radical forms
of resistance and criticism”.8
Conclusion
The first and second sections of this paper describe
the legal, political, and cultural obstacles that pre-
vent trans people from exercising their reproduc-
tive rights. Social awareness of these problems is
growing and requires an uptake that is up to the
challenge. To this end, the third section presents
the reproductive justice approach, which can pro-
vide access points in order to think about gender
and reproduction in ways that do not force trans
people to choose between their right to gender
identity and their reproductive rights.
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Résumé
Cet article examine comment la reconnaissance de
l’identité de genre des personnes transsexuelles
peut avoir des conséquences négatives sur leur
santé et leurs droits reproductifs. Premièrement,
il avance que, si le droit à l’identité de genre et
le droit à la santé sexuelle et reproductive font par-
tie de l’ensemble indivisible des droits de
l’homme, dans la pratique, les personnes transsex-
uelles sont forcées de choisir entre eux. Pour com-
prendre ce scénario, il faut se centrer sur les
dimensions eugéniques des politiques en matière
de transsexualité, même dans des États où la
reconnaissance d’une identité de genre autre que
celle attribuée à la naissance n’est pas liée à des
accommodements hormonaux ou chirurgicaux.
L’«eugénisme passif », concept inventé par James
Bowman il y a plus de vignt ans, est fort utile à
Resumen
Este artículo examina cómo el reconocimiento de
la identidad de género de personas trans puede
tener consecuencias negativas para su salud y
derechos reproductivos. En primer lugar, argu-
menta que, aunque el derecho a la identidad de
género y el derecho a la salud sexual y reproduc-
tiva son parte de los derechos humanos funda-
mentales indivisibles, en práctica las personas
trans son forzadas a elegir entre ellos. Para enten-
der esta hipótesis es necesario centrarse en las
dimensiones eugenésicas de las políticas trans,
incluso en estados donde el reconocimiento de
una identidad de género distinta a la asignada al
nacer no está asociado con compromisos quirúrgi-
cos u hormonales. El concepto de “eugenesia
pasiva”, acuñado por James Bowman hace más
de veinte años, ofrece una clave valiosa en este
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cet égard. Deuxièmement, l’article met en évi-
dence certains facteurs qui entravent une
approche réussie en matière de santé et de droits
reproductifs des personnes transsexuelles. Ces fac-
teurs comprennent: les imageries normatives sur
les capacités et les désirs de reproduction des per-
sonnes transsexuelles, les représentations de la
grossesse et la « féminité », et la forme prise par
les politiques sur l’identité dans les mouvements
féministes contemporains. L’attention accordée
en priorité (sinon exclusivement) à des initiatives
pour la légalisation de l’avortement librement con-
senti, comprise comme un droit des femmes (cis),
offre un exemple significatif de ces difficultés.
Enfin, l’article plaide en faveur de l’adoption
d’une approche de justice reproductive pour tra-
vailler sur la santé et les droits sexuels et reproduc-
tifs, avançant qu’elle a, parmi d’autres vertus, celle
de remettre en question la matrice binaire qui car-
actérise la pensée occidentale.
sentido. En segundo lugar, el artículo destaca algu-
nos factores que obstaculizan un enfoque exitoso
para la salud y los derechos reproductivos de las
personas trans. Entre estos factores se encuentran:
las representaciones normativas sobre las capaci-
dades y deseos reproductivos de las personas
trans, representaciones sobre el embarazo y la
“femineidad” y la forma que adoptan las políticas
de la identidad en movimientos feministas con-
temporáneos. La atención prestada de forma prior-
itaria (si no exclusiva) a iniciativas por la
legalización de la interrupción voluntaria del
embarazo, entendida como un derecho de mujeres
(cis), ofrece un ejemplo significativo de estas difi-
cultades. Por último, el artículo aboga por la adop-
ción de un enfoque de justicia reproductiva en
materia de salud y derechos sexuales y reproducti-
vos, señalando que una de sus virtudes es la de
cuestionarla matriz binaria que caracteriza el pen-
samiento occidental.
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